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WHAT CONGRESS’S REPEAL  
EFFORTS CAN TEACH US  
ABOUT REGULATORY REFORM 
CARY COGLIANESE* & GABRIEL SCHEFFLER** 
ABSTRACT 
Major legislative actions during the early part of the 115th Congress have undermined 
the central argument for regulatory reform measures such as the REINS Act, a bill that 
would require congressional approval of all new major regulations.  Proponents of the 
REINS Act argue that it would make the federal regulatory system more democratic by 
shifting responsibility for regulatory decisions away from unelected bureaucrats and toward 
the people’s representatives in Congress.  But separate legislative actions in the opening of 
the 115th Congress only call this argument into question.  Congress’s most significant ini-
tiatives during this period—its derailed attempts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care 
Act and its successful efforts to repeal fifteen regulations under the Congressional Review 
Act—exhibited a startling lack of democratic deliberation.  These repeal efforts reveal how 
the REINS Act would counterintuitively undermine key democratic elements of the current 
regulatory process by rendering it less transparent and deliberative. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 44	
I. Congress, Agencies, and Democracy ....................................................... 45	
II. Stark Lessons from “Repeal and Replace” ............................................. 48	
III. Further Lessons from the Congressional Review Act ............................ 51	
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 54	
 
 *   Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, and Director 
of the Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
**   Regulation Fellow, Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. 
 We thank Adam Finkel, Alexandra Johnson, Jomo Kassaye, Ronald Levin, and 
Daniel Walters for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
44 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW ACCORD [3:1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Insane.”1  “Secret.”2  “Not a responsible way to legislate.”3  These are 
just some of the ways that Republicans in Congress have described their 
own party’s efforts in 2017 to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Not 
only did Republicans ultimately stumble in repealing and replacing the Act, 
but the legislative process they followed undermined, however unintention-
ally, the rationale for another one of their legislative priorities: regulatory 
reform.  
One of the most prominent regulatory reform bills advanced by Repub-
licans—the Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) 
Act—would dramatically increase congressional involvement in the rule-
making process by requiring Congress to approve all major agency rules 
before they could become law.4  Proponents of this bill argue that it would 
make the federal regulatory system more transparent and democratic by 
shifting responsibility from unelected bureaucrats and requiring direct de-
liberation by the people’s representatives in Congress.5 
But in key respects, the process used by agencies to create regulations is 
generally more democratic than how Congress tends to operate.6  Con-
 
1. Benjamin Hart, The Best GOP Reactions to the Death of Trumpcare, DAILY 
INTELLIGENCER (July 18, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/the-best-
gop-reactions-to-the-death-of-trumpcare.html. 
2. Paulina Firozi, Rand Paul Blasts GOP for Keeping ObamaCare Bill in 'Secure Location,' THE 
HILL (Mar. 2, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/321990-paul-blasts-house-gop-
for-keeping-obamacare-bill-in-secure-location. 
3. Joe Lawlor, Sen. Susan Collins Criticizes Secretive Process of Senate Health Care Replacement 
Bill, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (June 16, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com/2017/ 
06/16/susan-collins-criticizes-secretive-process-of-senate-health-care-replacement-bill/.  
4. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th 
Cong. § 3 (2017). 
5. See, e.g., Senators Reintroduce REINS Act, U.S. SEN. RAND PAUL OF KY. (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.paul.senate.gov/news/senators-reintroduce-reins-act  (describing regulatory 
agencies as “wreaking havoc” on the nation and arguing that the REINS Act would ensure 
proper “accountability, oversight, and transparency”); Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “REINS” 
on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 36 (2013) 
(arguing that “[t]he REINS Act forces major regulatory decisions onto the floor of Congress, 
and into the open, which provides greater transparency than backroom dealmaking or the 
administrative rulemaking process” and which “provides a means of enhancing political ac-
countability for regulatory policy”). 
6. To be sure, agencies might seem at first glance to be less democratic simply because 
they are headed by unelected officials.  But that narrow view fails to account for the fact that 
agencies are, in important ways, tied closely to the electorate through the President, not to 
mention through ongoing congressional oversight.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Admin-
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gress’s own actions—in particular, its attempts to repeal and replace the 
ACA, as well as the way in which it repealed fifteen regulations under the 
Congressional Review Act in 2017—show that efforts to shift regulatory 
decisionmaking into the legislative process would in reality weaken demo-
cratic deliberation and result in less thoughtful regulatory decisions.  If the 
nation wants its regulatory system to reflect robust public deliberation, then 
passing legislation that would further entangle regulatory decisionmaking in 
legislative politics is likely to prove counterproductive. 
I. CONGRESS, AGENCIES, AND DEMOCRACY 
In a nation dedicated to democratic principles, it may seem surprising 
that most federal law in the United States today consists of rules or regula-
tions issued by administrative agencies, rather than statutes written by 
Congress.  Each year, agencies such as the Department of Transportation 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission collectively issue thousands 
of regulations,7 compared to roughly a hundred or fewer substantive stat-
utes passed by Congress.8  
Although the administrators who head federal bureaucracies never stand 
for election, they are, of course, still accountable to elected officials in mul-
tiple ways.  Appointed by the President, most administrators continue to 
serve only at the President’s pleasure and under the oversight of the White 
House.  Moreover, the Senate must confirm the heads of agencies before 
they can take office.  Congress must also expressly delegate to agencies the 
legal authority to create rules.  When agencies issue rules, they must follow 
well-specified procedures that, among other things, require that the public 
receive notice and have an opportunity to comment on proposed rules be-
fore they can be made final.9  Agencies must stay within the bounds of these 
statutory guidelines or else the courts will strike down their regulations. 
 
istration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332 (2001) (“[P]residential leadership establishes an elec-
toral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to 
the former.”).  Moreover, electoral accountability is only one facet of democratic govern-
ance; another is the quality of democratic deliberation in policy decisionmaking.  See, e.g., 
Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103–32 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1989) (discussing de-
liberation as one core conception of democracy). 
7. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE 
FEDERAL REGISTER 1 (2016). 
8. Drew DeSilver, Congress’ Productivity Improves Somewhat in 2015, PEW RES. CTR.: 
FACTANK (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/29/congress-
productivity-improves-somewhat-in-2015/.  
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). 
46 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW ACCORD [3:1 
Congress gives agencies the authority to issue legally binding rules be-
cause, among other reasons, legislators have neither the time nor the exper-
tise to make all the highly technical policy judgments needed to enact sensi-
ble, effective regulations.  Congress can call for greater safety in consumer 
products or reductions in water pollution, but figuring out exactly how to 
achieve these goals demands an in-depth understanding of regulated indus-
tries and an ability to establish more fine-grained policies.10  Administrative 
agencies—staffed as they are with career professionals, many with back-
grounds in science and economics—constitute what Cass Sunstein has 
called the “most knowledgeable branch” of government.11  The officials in 
these agencies can take the time and devote the resources needed to gather 
public input and craft rules designed to implement the goals contained in 
statutes.  
Although it makes sense for Congress to give regulatory authority to 
agencies, when Congress does so, it effectively gives up some degree of con-
trol over public policy decisions and their implementation.  Congress still 
maintains control over agency budgets and continues to oversee what agen-
cies do, and it always retains the ability to enact new laws that revise agen-
cies’ authority, but the officials who run administrative agencies neverthe-
less possess considerable lawful discretion in deciding how to design 
regulatory standards.  That agency discretion, in turn, enables the federal 
government to be more responsive to public concerns.12 
In an effort to retain more meaningful control over regulations, Congress 
used to insert legislative veto clauses into regulatory statutes, providing that 
agency regulations could be rejected by a majority vote of sometimes just a 
single chamber of Congress.  But in 1983, the Supreme Court declared 
such legislative veto provisions unconstitutional in Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha.13  The Court said that if Congress wishes to override 
agency decisions, then both chambers of Congress must pass legislation 
voiding or changing an agency decision or regulation—and that legislation 
either must win the president’s signature or be passed with sufficient major-
ities to override a presidential veto.14  In short, if Congress does not like a 
regulation that an agency creates, then it must follow the process outlined 
 
10. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: In-
formational Strategy and Regulatory Policy Making, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004). 
11. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1607 
(2016). 
12. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985) (arguing for giving “authority to administrators as a device for 
improving the responsiveness government to the desires of the electorate”). 
13. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).  
14. Id. at 956–57. 
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in the Constitution for adopting legislation.15  
As a practical matter, this means that Congress needs veto-proof majori-
ties to pass legislation overriding an agency regulation, since presidents can 
be expected to veto legislation rejecting the regulations created by agencies 
within their own administrations.  After all, the heads of agencies are the 
President’s appointees and, for most agencies, significant rules only go for-
ward if they receive the blessing of the White House.16 
Congress responded to the Court’s ruling in Chadha over a decade later 
by enacting the Congressional Review Act (CRA).17  The CRA does not 
obviate the constitutional requirements for passing legislation, but it estab-
lishes a fast-track process that enables Congress to repeal recent agency 
regulations by following special internal procedures, which most notably 
limit filibusters in the Senate.18  After an agency notifies Congress of a new 
regulation it has adopted, if Congress wishes to avail itself of the CRA’s 
procedures, then it has sixty session days to pass a resolution disapproving 
the regulation.19  If the resolution passes both houses and is signed by the 
president, then the disapproved regulation is formally repealed.20  Further-
more, if a regulation is repealed under the CRA, then the agency is barred 
from adopting any other regulation in the future that is “substantially the 
same,” unless Congress adopts new legislation that specifically gives the 
agency permission to do so.21 
Of course, presidents can always veto disapproval resolutions, which, as 
noted, they presumably would do for any regulations emanating from their 
own administrations.  For this reason, the CRA as a practical matter has 
generally come into play only shortly following presidential transitions, 
since it offers the new president a short window to overturn regulations that 
were issued toward the end of the previous administration.22 
 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3. 
16. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993). 
17. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). 
18. Id. § 802(a), (d). 
19. Id.  § 802. 
20. Id. § 801(b)(1). 
21. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the “Substantial-
ly Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the E-Word (Ergonomics) 
Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 710 (2011).  What constitutes a rule that is “substantially the 
same” has yet to be decided in the courts, but the issue may well be litigated in the coming 
years.  See Michael J. Cole, Interpreting the Congressional Review Act: Why the Courts Should Assert 
Judicial Review, Narrowly Construe ‘Substantially the Same,’ and Decline to Defer to Agencies Under 
Chevron, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=3009317. 
22. MAEVE P. CAREY, ALISSA M. DOLAN, & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
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In recent years, Republican members of Congress have been trying to 
pass additional bills that would give Congress more practical influence over 
agency regulations.  For example, the House of Representatives has passed 
a bill that would expand the scope of the CRA by allowing Congress to re-
peal multiple regulations at once by voting on a single resolution of disap-
proval, rather than just proceeding one regulation at a time as provided in 
the CRA.23   
The REINS Act would go still further.  Instead of Congress just having 
the power to disapprove of regulations after agencies have already issued 
them, the REINS Act would require that Congress take affirmative action 
to approve new regulations before they could take effect.24  The bill’s re-
quirement for legislative approval would apply only to “major rules,” which 
generally are those with economic effects above $100 million annually.25  
For such regulations, the REINS Act would turn an otherwise final agency 
rule into merely a legislative proposal, subject to an up-or-down vote.  The 
House passed the REINS Act in January 2017,26 and President Donald 
Trump has reportedly said that he will sign it if it reaches his desk.27 
II. STARK LESSONS FROM “REPEAL AND REPLACE” 
The REINS Act is ostensibly designed to make regulations more demo-
cratic by increasing Congress’s role in the regulatory process.  Yet the way 
that Congress has handled its legislative affairs undermines the case for leg-
islation requiring greater congressional involvement in the regulatory pro-
cess.  In particular, the means by which Republicans sought to repeal and 
replace the ACA in 2017 illustrate all too well how increased legislative in-
volvement would serve to weaken democratic deliberation over government 
regulation.  
Members of Congress from both parties, as well as longtime observers of 
congressional politics, have expressed shock at how congressional leaders 
conducted the process to try to repeal and replace the ACA.28  House Re-
 
QUESTIONS, CRS REPORT (Nov. 17, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf. 
23. Midnight Rules Relief Act of 2017, H.R. 21, 115th Cong. § 2(b) (2017–2018).  
24. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26, 115th 
Cong. § 3 (2017). 
25. Id. 
26. H.R. 26, 115th Cong. (2017).  
27. Phil Kerpen, It's Time to Rein in Regulators, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/12/30/s-time-rein-regulators/96001658. 
28. Julie Rovner (@jrovner), TWITTER (July 24, 2017, 4:56 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
jrovner/status/889635369418973188?refsrc=email&s=11; Jackie Calmes (@jackiekcalmes), 
TWITTER (July 25, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://twitter.com/jackiekcalmes/status/ 
889861274129059840?wpisrc=nl_wonk&wpmm=1.  
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publicans narrowly passed a repeal-and-replace bill in May 2017 that had 
only been released the night before the vote.29  House leaders thus not only 
short-circuited any opportunity for public deliberation, but they did not 
even wait for members to read and digest the legislation or to benefit from 
the scoring of the legislation typically provided by the Congressional Budg-
et Office (CBO).30  As Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) commented at the 
time, “any bill that has been posted less than 24 hours—going to be debat-
ed three or four hours, not scored—needs to be viewed with suspicion.”31  
When attention turned to the Senate during the summer months, the 
process was no more transparent or deliberative.  Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell (R-KY) crafted the Senate’s version of the legislation in com-
plete secrecy, prompting Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) to complain that 
Senate leaders were trying to “jam this thing through” before the Fourth of 
July recess.32  Johnson emphasized the need for more information about the 
bill, lamenting that informed debate “seems to be foreign to this place.”33  
Despite such complaints, when McConnell tried to move the legislation 
forward after the July holiday recess, the process proved no more informed 
than before.  Republicans approved a motion to proceed with debate on a 
bill before they had even settled upon a bill.34  In a widely-lauded speech on 
 
29. Rachel Sachs, Why Process Matters: Health Care Reform Edition, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 
9, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-process-matters-health-care-reform-edition.  
30. Sarah Kliff, Congress is Voting Thursday on a Bill to Replace Obamacare; The CBO Still 
Hasn’t Scored It, VOX (May 3, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/ 
5/3/15536680/voxcare-ahca-vote-cbo-score-absurd. 
31. Matt Flegenheimer, The Next Step for the Republican Health Care Bill: A Skeptical Senate, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/politics/senate-
health-care-bill.html.  Of course, a few months later, Senator Graham would find himself 
putting forth a hastily drafted bill as part of a failed, last-ditch effort to undo the Affordable 
Care Act. 
32. Jack O’Brien, Ron Johnson on Senate Healthcare Bill: Leadership Wants ‘to Jam this Thing 
Through’, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com 
/ron-johnson-on-senate-healthcare-bill-leadership-wants-to-jam-this-thing-through/article/ 
2627088. 
33. More Time, Information Needed on Bill: GOP Senator, MORNING JOE (MSNBC television 
broadcast June 28, 2017), http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/more-time-
information-needed-on-bill-gop-senator-977889859851.  
34. Sean Sullivan, Kelsey Snell, Ed O’Keefe & John Wagner, McCain’s Return to Senate 
Injects Momentum into GOP Health-Care Battle, WASH. POST (July 24, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trumps-tough-talk-on-health-care-aims-to-revive-flag 
ging-senate-effort/2017/07/24/a8acdb3e-7091-11e7-9eac-d56bd5568db8_story.html (not-
ing widespread “confusion Monday about exactly which direction senators would go on 
Tuesday when and if the voting starts” and reporting Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) as asking 
about the motion to proceed, “What are we proceeding to?”). 
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the Senate floor, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) decried McConnell’s strate-
gy of “coming up with a proposal behind closed doors” and “then springing 
it on skeptical members”—although he, too, supported the initial motion to 
proceed.35  
McConnell’s gambit ultimately failed—with Senators Susan Collins (R-
ME), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and, most dramatically, McCain casting the 
decisive votes to kill the legislation.  Down to the very end, the tactics were 
the same.  The underlying “skinny repeal” bill—which the CBO estimated 
would have left sixteen million people uninsured and raised premiums in 
the exchanges by twenty percent—was released only a few hours before the 
decisive vote.36  Senator Graham called the bill a “disaster” and a 
“fraud.”37  He and two other Republican Senators said they would vote for 
it only if they received assurances that it would never become law.38 
When Senator Graham and Senator Bill Cassidy (R-LA) revived the 
health care repeal effort in September, Senate Republicans once again tried 
to rush the bill to a vote as quickly as possible.  This time, they released the 
final version of the Graham-Cassidy bill only a few days before the Senate 
was scheduled to vote on it.  They held just a single legislative hearing— 
one at which the majority called other senators to be the principal witnesses 
and at which only five members of the public were reportedly allowed to 
attend after protests occurred in the hearing room.39  Senate leaders also 
did not intend to wait for a complete CBO score, and they planned to allow 
only ninety seconds of floor debate.40  Yet this effort too failed, as three Re-
 
35. McCain’s Speech on the Senate Floor, CNN (July 25, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/07/25/politics/john-mccain-speech-full-text-senate/index.html. 
36.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUE EFFECTS 
OF H.R. 1628, THE HEALTHCARE FREEDOM ACT OF 2017, AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE 
OF A SUBSTITUTE (S.A. 667) (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-
2017-2018/costestimate/s.a.667.pdf. 
37. Graham: ‘Skinny’ GOP Health-Care Bill is a ‘Disaster,’ ‘Fraud,’ WASH. POST (July 27, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/graham-skinny-gop-health-care-
bill-is-a-disaster-fraud/2017/07/27/c263b2dc-7311-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_video.html. 
38. These Senators demanded assurances from the House Speaker that he would not 
approve the exact same bill, so that they would have an opportunity to make further 
amendments in a conference committee.  Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Rejects 
Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-repub 
licans-revolt.html. 
39. Dana Milbank, Cassidy is ‘Sorry’ About the Cassidy-Graham Process. He Should Be., WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cassidy-is-sorry-about-
the-cassidy-graham-process-he-should-be/2017/09/25/0cd234f0-a243-11e7-ade1-76d061d 
56efa_story.html.  
40. Bob Bryan, The Latest Republican Obamacare Repeal is Being Pushed through the Senate at 
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publicans vowed to vote against the bill, denying Republicans the majority 
they needed to act under a special budget reconciliation process that is ex-
empt from the Senate filibuster.41  
Whatever the future of the ACA may be, the Republicans’ repeal-and-
replace saga is emblematic of a larger shift away from legislative procedures 
designed to ensure that Congress engages in robust deliberation.42  Even 
though the process used to attempt to repeal the ACA might seem like an 
extreme example, the reality is that for years now, in the face of growing 
political polarization, most controversial legislation under both Democratic 
and Republican leadership of Congress has often moved forward in what 
political scientist Barbara Sinclair has aptly, if perhaps charitably, described 
as an “unorthodox” manner—driven by party leaders and often bypassing 
or dismissing the work of committees.43  The REINS Act, if enacted, would 
only risk infusing such unorthodoxy into major regulatory decisions.44  
III. FURTHER LESSONS FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 
Other legislative actions during the opening of the 115th Congress have 
presented a similarly revealing, if also disconcerting, picture of what greater 
congressional involvement in the regulatory process would look like.  Dur-
ing the first ten months of 2017, Congress used the CRA to repeal fifteen 
 
Lightning Speed, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/graham-
cassidy-health-care-obamacare-repeal-vote-timeline-2017-9; Elise Viebeck, Seven Ways the 
Latest Republican Health-Care Effort is Impulsive and Chaotic, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/seven-ways-the-latest-republican-health-care-
effort-is-impulsive-and-chaotic/2017/09/24/4451aaf4-9fa1-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_stor 
y.html.  
41. Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They Will Not Vote on Health 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/ 
mcconnell-obamacare-repeal-graham-cassidy-trump.html. 
42. Republicans pursued a similar legislative strategy with the tax overhaul they passed 
at the end of 2017.  See, e.g., John Cassidy, The Republican Tax Strategy: Speed, Subterfuge, and Di-
version, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/the-republican-tax-strategy-speed-subterfuge-and-diversion; Cary Coglianese, 
Tax Reform Saga Should Alarm Defenders of Democratic Process, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/365556-tax-reform-saga-should-alarm-defenders-of-de 
mocratic-process. 
43. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2011).  
44. Some leading scholars have argued that the rulemaking process has seen its own 
recent introduction of unorthodox practices.  Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & 
Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789  (2015).  
Even if this is the case, the REINS Act would still amount to a radical change in the rule-
making process.  
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regulations that were designed to deliver public protections on issues such 
as Internet privacy, gun safety, water quality, and fair business practices.45  
Senate Majority Leader McConnell hailed the repeals of these rules as the 
most significant legislative achievements of the 115th Congress’s first six 
months,46 but a look at how Congress went about repealing these rules only 
reinforces the conclusion that the first branch of government suffers from a 
deliberative deficit. 
Consider who participated in the development—and subsequent re-
peal—of the now-defunct rules.  Based on the agency dockets for each of 
the fifteen regulations, staff at the agencies that issued these rules reviewed 
a total of over 420,000 public comments.47  These comments came from a 
diverse collection of individual members of the public as well as from busi-
nesses, public interest groups, and state and local officials.  By contrast, the 
process Congress used in repealing these rules appears to have been driven 
largely by just one segment of society: industry.  The New York Times report-
ed that industry lobbyists began working with Republican staff members on 
Capitol Hill “within days of the election” to decide which regulations to 
target for repeal.48 
Not only do agencies entertain a full array of public comments, they also 
must take the time to respond to these comments in writing as they prepare 
their analyses of their proposed rules.49  Most significant rules must be sepa-
rately reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) in the White House.50  Such painstaking analysis and deliberation 
can take time—nearly two and a half years on average for the fifteen re-
cently repealed rules.  The final versions of these same regulations together 
contained over 1,700 pages of justification and analysis, all made available 
to the public.  
Unlike agencies, Congress is not required to respond to public comments 
 
45. RULES AT RISK (Dec. 25, 2017), http://rulesatrisk.org/.  
46. Ryan Grim, Mitch McConnell Has Run Out of Excuses for Not Accomplishing Anything, 
INTERCEPT (July 18, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/07/18/mitch-mcconnell-has-
run-out-of-excuses-for-not-accomplishing-anything/.  
47. All calculations and data referred to in this section are available upon request. 
48. Eric Lipton, G.O.P. Hurries to Slash Oil and Gas Rules, Ending Industries’ 8-Year Wait, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/republicans 
-oil-gas-regulations.html.  
49. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 & 706 (2012) (requiring agencies 
to publish a statement of a rule’s “basis and purpose” and to avoid acting in an “arbitrary” 
manner); see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency Discre-
tion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 226 (Michael 
E. Herz, Richard Murphy, & Kathryn Watts, eds., 2017) (“Courts have long held that an 
agency must respond to ‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ comments.”). 
50. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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or to explain its decisions.  Congress managed to repeal all fifteen rules 
combined in fewer than 2,000 words—what amounts to roughly six double-
spaced pages of text in total.51  Furthermore, by repealing these regulations 
under the CRA, Congress by extension banned agencies from adopting any 
substantially similar regulations in the future—all without explaining to the 
public how repealing these rules will affect their welfare.52  
In contrast to the years that agencies spent evaluating comments and an-
alyzing their regulations, it took Congress a mere four months on average—
including congressional recesses—for both chambers to vote to repeal the 
fifteen regulations, mostly on party-line votes.53  Even if Congress wanted to 
take a more deliberate approach, the CRA’s fast-track procedures explicitly 
limit the time for floor debate on resolutions of disapproval.54  
Congress can no longer use this law’s special procedures to repeal regu-
lations adopted by the Obama Administration due to the CRA’s limitation 
on disapprovals after sixty session days following notice of a rulemaking.55  
But this has not kept members of Congress from using the CRA to target 
additional regulatory actions adopted since January by independent agen-
cies which are exempt from OIRA review and thus more insulated from 
White House influence.  In October 2017, Congress passed a resolution of 
disapproval overturning a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regula-
tion adopted in July 2017 that would have blocked credit card companies 
and banks from inserting mandatory arbitration clauses into their contracts 
that keep consumers from taking legal action over complaints of institution-
al abuses.56  President Trump signed this resolution into law at a private 
signing ceremony reportedly attended by the heads of various bank lobby-
ing groups.57 
Until this year, the only previous occasion when Congress used the CRA 
to strike down a regulation occurred in 2001, when Congress repealed a 
major Occupational Safety and Health Administration workplace safety 
rule adopted at the end of the Clinton Administration.  At the time, Peg 
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55. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
56. David Sherfinski, House Votes to undo Federal Consumer Bureau’s Arbitration Rule, WASH. 
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Seminario, the Director for Health and Safety for the American Federation 
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, complained to the New 
York Times about what she called the “stunning” process Congress followed: 
“This rule is ten years in the making, with ten weeks of public hearings on 
it, and now they want to wipe it out with not even one hearing and less 
than ten hours of debate.  That’s about as undemocratic a process as you 
can get.”58 
CONCLUSION 
The REINS Act would go much farther than the CRA because it would 
require legislative approval of all major rules before they could take legal 
effect.  It would also curtail democratic deliberation by Congress even more 
sharply than the CRA.  Under the REINS Act, debate over a regulation in 
the House would be limited to one hour total, while the “world’s greatest 
deliberative body”59—the Senate—would be afforded a whopping two 
hours.60  With major public health and welfare consequences potentially 
hanging in the balance, such tight constraints on legislative debate are at 
odds with the REINS Act’s ostensible goal of advancing sound, democratic 
decisionmaking.  
Of course, time limits on debate can be viewed as understandable from 
another perspective: Congress already has a lot on its plate.  Agencies typi-
cally produce close to 100 regulations each year that would be deemed 
“major” under the REINS Act and which would demand formal approval 
by Congress.   
Moreover, members of Congress are generalists.61  That is one of the 
main reasons for Congress delegating regulatory responsibility to agency 
officials in the first place, as agencies have the time, resources, and expertise 
needed to analyze policy issues with care.62  It is precisely because Congress 
does not have the time and resources to attend to the finer details of regula-
tion that it has passed laws which delegate rulemaking responsibility to 
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agencies, such as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,63 the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,64 and the Clean Water Act.65 
In fulfilling their statutory duties, agencies typically invest years of study 
and public engagement when developing major regulations and preparing 
the necessary underlying analyses of how the public will be affected by the 
new rules.66  Under the REINS Act, the outcome of those extensive agency 
deliberations would ultimately hinge on a legislative process culminating in 
a mere three hours of floor debate.67   
If the REINS Act were law, failure of both chambers to approve a regu-
lation within seventy session days would mean that the regulation could not 
take effect, and no new approval resolution could be considered until after 
the next congressional election.68  In emergencies, the president would be 
authorized to override the Act temporarily and allow the regulation to take 
effect—but only for ninety calendar days, after which the regulation would 
cease to have any legal impact again.69 
If the Senate were to pass the REINS Act and President Trump were to 
sign it, then agencies’ regulatory decisionmaking in the future could well 
become infected with some of the same dysfunctionalities that both Demo-
crats and Republicans find afflict today’s congressional process.  Right now, 
administrative law calls upon agencies to make decisions based on public 
input and analysis of how best to fulfill their statutory responsibilities and 
advance overall public value.70  By adding a legal requirement for congres-
sional approval before regulations can take effect, the REINS Act would 
effectively encourage agencies to base their decisions over highly complex 
and consequential regulations not on deliberations focused on the expected 
impacts on all segments of society, but instead on consideration of political 
stratagems in Congress, be it controlled by Republicans or Democrats.  
One thing is clear: Republican legislators have, through their actions in 
Congress over the first part of 2017, ironically made a case against one of 
the very regulatory reforms they favor.  Through their handling of the most 
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salient legislative debate in the opening months of the new Congress—
health care—and arguably their most significant early domestic policy ac-
complishment—the CRA repeals—they have unwittingly undercut the case 
for the REINS Act.  Rather than inspire confidence that increased congres-
sional involvement in regulation would enhance democratic values, the Re-
publicans’ repeal efforts have only underscored the rationale underlying 
earlier Congresses’ decisions to vest administrative agencies with the prima-
ry responsibility for making important regulatory determinations.  
 
